New-York · The essays of Publius · 1787–1788
A reading edition for today
Read the debate in the form it first entered public life.
In 1787 and 1788, the essays of “Publius” arrived one by one in New York newspapers. This edition brings all eighty-five together with their original words, an optional clean reading view, and a little friendly context for the conversation afterward.
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Federalist number 1
General Introduction
Introduces the ratification debate and asks readers to choose reflection over passion.
Federalist number 2
Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
Argues that Americans already form one people and should remain one nation.
Federalist number 3
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
Says one capable national government can better prevent justified wars with foreign powers.
Federalist number 4
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
Argues that Union also deters wars driven by foreign ambition rather than American wrongdoing.
Federalist number 5
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
Warns that separate confederacies would invite rivalry, foreign influence, and strategic weakness.
Federalist number 6
Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
Rejects the hope that independent states would remain peaceful simply because they are republics.
Federalist number 7
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States)
Shows how trade, borders, debt, and western lands could turn states against one another.
Federalist number 8
The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
Predicts that disunion would produce standing armies, fortified borders, and shrinking liberty.
Federalist number 9
The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
Claims an extended federal republic can restrain faction and domestic violence.
Federalist number 10
The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection)
Explains how a large republic can control faction without suppressing liberty.
Federalist number 11
The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
Connects Union to commercial power, maritime strength, and bargaining leverage abroad.
Federalist number 12
The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
Argues that Union makes revenue collection fairer, easier, and less dependent on intrusive taxes.
Federalist number 13
Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
Says one national government costs less than several complete confederate governments.
Federalist number 14
Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered
Defends representative government across a large territory and distinguishes republic from democracy.
Federalist number 15
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
Argues that the Confederation is collapsing because it governs states rather than individuals.
Federalist number 16
The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
Explains why coercing delinquent states would mean civil war, not ordinary law enforcement.
Federalist number 17
The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
Predicts states will remain powerful because daily life keeps citizens attached to local government.
Federalist number 18
The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
Uses ancient Greek leagues to show how weak confederacies invite domination and disorder.
Federalist number 19
The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
Finds the Germanic confederation too weak to prevent internal war or outside interference.
Federalist number 20
The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
Uses the Netherlands to argue that unanimity and state sovereignty produce weakness and delay.
Federalist number 21
Other Defects of the Present Confederation
Identifies missing sanctions, mutual guarantees, and revenue as fatal defects of the Confederation.
Federalist number 22
The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation)
Adds commercial weakness, unequal voting, unanimity, and missing courts to the case against the Articles.
Federalist number 23
The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
Says national defense requires complete authority over the means needed to provide it.
Federalist number 24
The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
Defends congressional control of standing forces while emphasizing legislative checks and practical need.
Federalist number 25
The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered)
Argues defense cannot safely depend on states or on rigid constitutional bans.
Federalist number 26
The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered.
Claims legislative control makes military tyranny less likely under the Constitution than under the Articles.
Federalist number 27
The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)
Predicts a competent federal government will gain obedience through ordinary administration, not force.
Federalist number 28
The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)
Treats force as a last resort against rebellion and argues federalism gives citizens multiple defenses.
Federalist number 29
Concerning the Militia
Defends federal authority over the militia while rejecting fears of universal military regimentation.
Federalist number 30
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
Begins the case for broad federal taxation as the indispensable support of national responsibilities.
Federalist number 31
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
Uses first principles to argue that unlimited responsibilities require adequate, not artificially limited, revenue powers.
Federalist number 32
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
Explains that federal taxation generally coexists with state taxation rather than eliminating it.
Federalist number 33
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
Defends the Necessary and Proper and Supremacy Clauses as statements of unavoidable constitutional logic.
Federalist number 34
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
Argues federal and state revenue needs cannot be divided neatly by fixed categories.
Federalist number 35
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
Defends broad taxation and representation while considering who will understand different economic interests.
Federalist number 36
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
Concludes that federal taxation can use local knowledge and coexist with state revenue systems.
Federalist number 37
Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government.
Describes the Convention’s immense difficulty balancing energy, liberty, federalism, and practical compromise.
Federalist number 38
The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed.
Mocks inconsistent objections and asks critics to compare the Constitution with realistic alternatives.
Federalist number 39
The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
Defines republican government and explains the Constitution’s mixture of federal and national features.
Federalist number 40
On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained.
Defends the Convention’s authority to propose a new system rather than merely revise the Articles.
Federalist number 41
General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution
Begins reviewing federal powers by defending security powers against charges of dangerous breadth.
Federalist number 42
The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
Reviews powers over foreign affairs, interstate relations, trade, naturalization, and related national concerns.
Federalist number 43
The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered)
Defends miscellaneous powers involving federal property, republican government, amendments, debts, and ratification.
Federalist number 44
Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
Defends limits on state powers and the clauses needed to make federal authority effective.
Federalist number 45
The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments.
Argues federal powers are few, targeted, and less threatening than the states’ broad everyday authority.
Federalist number 46
The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
Says states possess stronger popular ties and ample tools to resist federal encroachment.
Federalist number 47
The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts.
Explains that separated powers may overlap without being dangerously concentrated in the same hands.
Federalist number 48
These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other.
Warns that written boundaries alone cannot stop the legislature from absorbing other powers.
Federalist number 49
Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention.
Rejects frequent popular conventions as the ordinary remedy for disputes among branches.
Federalist number 50
Periodical Appeals to the People Considered
Argues scheduled conventions would be too late, too partisan, and too weak to prevent encroachment.
Federalist number 51
The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments.
Makes ambition counteract ambition through checks, balances, federalism, and competing interests.
Federalist number 52
The House of Representatives
Defends the House’s direct election, voter qualifications, and two-year terms.
Federalist number 53
The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives)
Argues two-year House terms provide needed knowledge without sacrificing accountability.
Federalist number 54
The Apportionment of Members Among the States
Explains representation and direct taxation by population while confronting the three-fifths compromise.
Federalist number 55
The Total Number of the House of Representatives
Defends the initial size of the House against fears that it is too small.
Federalist number 56
The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives)
Says representatives can understand local interests without mirroring every locality or occupation.
Federalist number 57
The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation.
Argues elections and shared civic life will keep representatives from becoming a privileged class.
Federalist number 58
Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands.
Defends future House growth and rejects fears that smaller states or the Senate can permanently block it.
Federalist number 59
Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
Defends federal authority over congressional elections as essential to preserving the Union.
Federalist number 60
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
Rejects claims that Congress will rig election rules to create a favored social class.
Federalist number 61
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
Concludes that federal election safeguards are ordinary prudence, not evidence of planned consolidation.
Federalist number 62
The Senate
Defends the Senate’s qualifications, state representation, staggered terms, and stabilizing role.
Federalist number 63
The Senate Continued
Argues the Senate supplies continuity, international credibility, and a check on temporary public error.
Federalist number 64
The Powers of the Senate
Defends the Senate’s role in treaties through select membership, secrecy, knowledge, and continuity.
Federalist number 65
The Powers of the Senate Continued
Defends Senate trials of impeachments as the least imperfect forum for political misconduct.
Federalist number 66
Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered.
Answers objections that Senate impeachment trials violate separation, bias senators, or weaken defendants’ protections.
Federalist number 67
The Executive Department
Begins defending the presidency by separating the Constitution’s text from exaggerated claims about executive power.
Federalist number 68
The Mode of Electing the President
Defends the Electoral College as a buffer against tumult, intrigue, and foreign influence.
Federalist number 69
The Real Character of the Executive
Contrasts the president’s limited, accountable powers with those of the British king and state governors.
Federalist number 70
The Executive Department Further Considered
Makes the classic case that an energetic executive requires unity, duration, support, and competent powers.
Federalist number 71
The Duration in Office of the Executive
Defends a four-year presidential term so the executive can resist temporary passions and carry policy through.
Federalist number 72
The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered.
Rejects presidential term limits as harmful to experience, accountability, continuity, and public choice.
Federalist number 73
The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
Defends presidential salary protection and the qualified veto as safeguards for executive independence.
Federalist number 74
The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive.
Assigns military command and pardons to the president for unity, speed, and humane discretion.
Federalist number 75
The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive
Defends shared treaty power as neither purely executive nor purely legislative.
Federalist number 76
The Appointing Power of the Executive
Defends presidential nomination with Senate consent as a balance of responsibility and restraint.
Federalist number 77
The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered.
Completes the executive defense by reviewing appointments, accountability, and the presidency’s overall balance.
Federalist number 78
The Judiciary Department
Defends judicial independence, lifetime tenure, and courts’ duty to prefer the Constitution over invalid laws.
Federalist number 79
The Judiciary Continued
Protects judicial salaries while preserving removal through impeachment for genuine misconduct.
Federalist number 80
The Powers of the Judiciary
Defines the categories of disputes that require federal rather than separate state courts.
Federalist number 81
The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority.
Explains the Supreme Court, inferior federal courts, and the limits of feared judicial supremacy.
Federalist number 82
The Judiciary Continued.
Argues state courts retain broad jurisdiction unless the Constitution makes federal jurisdiction exclusive.
Federalist number 83
The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
Rejects claims that the Constitution abolishes civil juries and leaves their design to future legislation.
Federalist number 84
Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
Argues a bill of rights is unnecessary and potentially dangerous while defending habeas and other protections.
Federalist number 85
Concluding Remarks
Concludes that ratification is safer than seeking uncertain perfection through another convention.
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